In this study, we have examined what effects the rise of China has on the growth of production and investment of Korean manufacturing industries. In doing so, we considered three main aspects of trade relation between Korea and China: import competition, third market competition and export to China. In addition, we further divided exports to China into capital goods exports and (non-machinery and non-capital equipment) intermediate goods exports. From various regression results, we could obtain both positive and negative effects from China's rise on production and investment growth of Korean manufacturing industries. On one hand, capital goods exports to China, rather than intermediate goods exports, was estimated to have positive effects on production growth of Korean manufacturing industries, especially during the period after the crisis. Results based on further division of capital goods into two subcategories reveals that especially exports of parts and accessories of machinery and capital equipment to China promoted growth of industries. Although we obtained some evidence that outward FDI to China promoted intermediate goods exports to China, particularly before the crisis, we were not able to find evidence that it promoted exports of parts and accessories (of machinery and capital equipment). On the other hand, import competition from China was estimated to have negative effects on both production and investment growth of Korean manufacturing industries, especially before the crisis. Overall, the regression results suggest that the positive effects from China's rise on the growth of Korean manufacturing industries have been strengthened after the crisis.
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I. Introduction
China's rapid economic growth as well as its integration into the world economy is probably one of the most important developments in external economic environment surrounding Korea and other East Asian countries. Over the past several decades, China sustained rapid economic growth of about nearly 10 percent per annum accompanied by the rapid trade expansion. As a result, China has recently become the third largest economy in GDP and second largest in trade. 1 Since the 1990s, the bilateral trade between Korea and China expanded impressively as well, making China the largest trading partner of Korea. China's share of Korea's exports rose from 0.9 percent in 1990 to 22.7 percent in 2007, making China the largest export market of Korea. During the same period, China's share of Korea's imports increased from 3.2% to 17.7 percent, making China the second largest importing partner of Korea.
What have been the effects of China on the economic growth of Korea? What have been major channels which are empirically important? To answer these questions, this study tries to examine how measures of various aspects of trade relationship between Korea and China are related to production and investment growth of 3-digit manufacturing industries of Korea. In this study, we consider primarily three channelsimport competition and third market competition from China and exports to China-and try to evaluate empirical importance of each channel through which Korean manufacturing industries are affected by the rise of China.
One could expect, on the one hand, that Korean manufacturing industries could have 1 There are many studies which document that the composition of China's exports is much more sophisticated than can be expected by her level of development, or that it is rapidly changing from labor intensive low-tech products to capital or skill intensive high-tech products. See Lall and Albaladejo (2004) , Rodrik (2006) , Schott (2006) , Kim et al. (2006) , for example. been adversely affected by the increasing competition pressure from low-wage countries such as China, consistent with the traditional comparative advantage theory of trade. In the case of the U.S., Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2002) shows that import competition from low-wage countries had adverse effects on output and employment growth of labor intensive manufacturing plants. In the case of Korea, however, manufacturing industries have faced increasing competition with China, not only in Korea's domestic market but also in world export market. So, we consider both import competition and third market competition in assessing the effects of the rise of China.
On the other hand, the rapid growth of China can provide an opportunity as well for growth of Korean manufacturing industries. Here, the primary channel is obviously exports to China. There is a growing body of literature which considers the spread of fragmentation of production as a distinguishing characteristic in recent rapid growth of world trade (for example, see Feenstra 1998 , Yi 2003 , Irwin 2005 . Also, many authors point out that the formation of regional production network, based on fragmentation of production as well as intra-regional foreign direct investment, has been particularly noticeable in East Asia (for example, Athukorala ??, Ando and Kimura ??).
In many of these studies, the increasing importance of intermediate goods trade is considered as a piece of evidence suggestive of the increasing importance of the fragmentation of production.
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Then what specific types of exports mattered for the growth of manufacturing industries in Korea? To answer this question, we further disaggregate exports to China 2 Irwin (2005) explains that technological progress that enabled the phenomenon of fragmentation of production has driven rapid increase in international trade. He points to vertical specialization and outsourcing as two tendencies reflecting this phenomenon. Here, vertical specialization refers to firms purchasing intermediate goods or parts in the market which have been previously produced within the firms. Outsourcing refers to the movement of the production processes of abroad. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2002) shows that import competition from low-wage countries had adverse effects on output and employment growth of labor intensive manufacturing plants in the U.S. For Korea, Kim et al. (2007) shows that Korea's outward FDI to China in Korean manufacturing promoted exports of parts and components to China, based on a survey data of some large firms. Kim (2006) examines the effects of the rise of China on the demand for labor, focusing on three channels-bilateral trade, third market competition, and FDI toward China. Our paper tries to provide an integrated view of the effect of the rise of China on growth of manufacturing industries in Korea, with a particular focus on the distinction between intermediate goods and capital goods exports to China.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly overviews recent 3 As will be shown later, Korea's consumption goods exports to China is a relatively minor proportion of the total exports. trends in production and investment growth of Korean manufacturing. In section III we explain our basic regression specification and main explanatory variables. Section IV provides our main regression results. Section V examines the relation between Korea's outward FDI to China and sub-categories of exports to China. Final section concludes.
II. Output and Investment Growth of Korean Manufacturing
In this section, we briefly overview trends in output and investment growth in the Korean economy, as well as in manufacturing sector. We use both National Account (NA) data and Survey of Mining and Manufacturing (SMM) to see whether broad trends in output and investment growth from SMM, which is employed in our analysis that follows, are similar to those from NA.
The aggregate real GDP growth rate of the Korean economy have exhibited downward trend since the 1980s (Table 1) . Annual average GDP growth rate, which was 8.4 percent in the 1980s, declined to 6.3 percent in the 1990s before the crisis that broke out in 1997. After the crisis the growth slowed down further to record 4.6 percent for the period from 2000 to 2006. Although the causes of the post-crisis growth slowdown in Korea have been a subject of heated debates, it is notable that the growth slowdown had already been in progress during the period of pre-crisis 1990s.
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// Insert Table 1 here// Manufacturing GDP growth rate declined from 11.4 percent in the 1980s to 7.0% during the period from 1991 to 1997, but hardly declined further after the crisis. Based on SMM, the average production growth rate in manufacturing sector increased slightly, rather than declined, after the crisis. So, it is suggested that the period when 4 Hahn and Shin (2007) discusses the sources of the post-crisis growth slowdown based on growth accounting analysis and evaluates the post-crisis growth performance of the Korean economy from a manufacturing GDP growth slowdown occurred was pre-crisis 1990s, rather than after the crisis.
The real equipment investment growth rate from NA has also shown declining trend since the 1980s. Contrasted with GDP growth, however, aggregate investment growth rate declined significantly after the crisis. In manufacturing sector, the real investment growth rate, calculated from SMM, also declined significantly after the crisis.
In sum, during the 1990s before the crisis, both output and investment growth in Korean manufacturing sector slowed down compared with 1980s. In spite of the overall growth slowdown after the crisis, output growth rate in manufacturing sector hardly declined after the crisis, although investment growth rate in manufacturing. Below, we examine how the rise of China affected the growth of output and investment in Korean manufacturing sector.
III. Specification of Regression Model and Variable Construction
Specification
As was discussed in Section I, main interest of this paper is to investigate what effects the rise of China has had an impact on growth of Korea's manufacturing industries and what the main channels are. We considered three different channels:
export to China (which in turn could be divided into two major categories: capital goods and intermediate goods), import competition with China in Korea's domestic market and third market competition with China. Thus, the basic specification of regression model is as follows. 
Data and Construction of Variables
We employed two main data sources. The first one is "Survey of Mining and
Manufacturing" conducted by KNSO (Korea National Statistical Office) . This Survey covers all establishments with five or more employees in mining and manufacturing sectors and contains necessary information to construct variables used in this paper at industry level, including output, employment, number of non-production and production workers, tangible fixed assets. The other main data source is "Comtrade Database" of United Nations from which all international trade data has been extracted.
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Main variables in our analysis were constructed as follows. Firstly, the real production growth rate was calculated from the Survey's nominal industrial production deflated by sectoral GDP deflator. 8 Yearly nominal investment was calculated as an annual increase in tangible fixed assets (machinery, building, and vehicle), which were deflated by investment deflator to give real investment.
Secondly, the measure of capital goods exports to China (XK) and the measure of intermediate goods exports to China (XI) were calculated as a share of capital goods 5 In fact, even if China's imports from Korea mainly consist of capital goods, for example, the expected sign on capital goods exports may not be clear. For example, it is plausible that the exports of capital goods from Korea to China could change China's comparative advantage in such a way that the competition between Korea and China increases in industries where the share of capital goods exports from Korea to China is high. However, we hope to control for this effect by the inclusion of the two competition measures. 6 One might be temped to think of alternative interpretation of the coefficients as the following. That is, if the coefficient of capital goods exports is positive while the coefficient of intermediate goods exports is not, then China's domestic demand, rather than low-cost production opportunity in China, is important to the growth of Korean manufacturing industries, and vice versa. However, we caution against this interpretation because the distinction between intermediate and capital goods may not be the same with the distinction between intermediate and final goods. This point will be discussed later in this paper. 7 All the variables in the paper were measured at 3-digit industry level according to KSIC. Appendix table shows the categorization of exports using BEC classification.
The measure of import competition with China in domestic market (MC) has been calculated following Schott (2002) and Bernard et al (2002) as follows:
This measure is a product of two different measures of import competition: value share (VSH) and product share (PSH). The value share is the share of imports from China in total imports in industry i. The product share is a product coverage ratio, which is the number of products in imports from China divided by the number of products in total imports at of industry i. So, this measure captures the imports competition from China in terms of both intensive and extensive margin.
Thirdly, the index of competition with China in the world market was calculated as: Finally, capital intensity (KI) of an industry is measured as natural logarithm of per worker tangible fixed assets averaged over the period, while skill intensity (HI) is the ratio of non-production worker to production worker.
Preliminary Analysis
In this subsection, we briefly review recent trends in the main explanatory variables, which measure various aspects of the trade relation between Korea and China. First of all, the measure of import competition from China has been increasing since the 1990s (Figure 1 ). The increase has been mostly driven by industries with low and medium capital intensity, although industries with high capital intensity also contributed to the increase recently. Similarly, the competition between Korea and China in the world export market has been increasing as well. This is primarily due to the rapid increase in China's market share. Korea's world market share has been fairly stable at around 3 percent.
// Insert Figure 1 here// // Insert Table 2 here// Next, the share of exports to China out of Korea's total exports has also increased rapidly since the 1990s ( goods exports to China is a relatively small portion of total exports to China, which is less than 3 percent for most years. In sum, Table 3 shows that the rapid increase in Korea's exports to China is mostly driven by the machinery and capital goods, which accounts for about two-thirds of total exports to China.
// Insert Table 3 here// Table 4 shows correlations of main explanatory variables averaged over the period from 1993 to 2003 with production and investment growth rates for the same period at threedigit industries. The table also shows correlations of the same variables for two subperiods: before (1993-1997) and after (1999-2003) the crisis. Firstly, import competition (MC) as well as third market competition (XC) is negatively correlated with both production and investment growth. The correlation coefficients are more strongly negative for the pre-crisis period than for the post-crisis period. Secondly, the share of capital goods exports (XK) is strongly positively correlated with production growth for the whole period as well as for each of the two sub-periods. Finally, the correlations between the share of intermediate goods exports (XI) and production or investment growth were negative, although their significance varied depending on the period of analysis. Table 5 shows cross-section regressions of production growth of industries for the whole sample period: 1993-2003. As expected, the measure of import competition from
IV. Main Regression Results
Production Growth
China enters all regressions with significantly negative coefficients, suggesting that import competition from China had an adverse effect on production growth of industries.
Although the coefficients on third market competition with China are also negative, however, it loses significance with the inclusion of capital goods exports variable.
//Insert Table 3 .
In order to see whether there are differences in the effects of various explanatory variables between pre-and post-crisis period, we also ran pooled regressions by dividing the sample period into two sub-periods: 1993-1997 and 1999-2003 . The explanatory variables in these regressions are the same explanatory variables measured for each sub-period interacted with pre-crisis (Db) or post-crisis dummy variable (Db).
The results from separate regressions for each sub-period are very similar to this approach, so we do not report them here.
In Table 6 , import competition from China has a negative effect on production growth of Korean manufacturing industries, with the effect strongly significant before the crisis. However, there were no strong evidence suggesting that third market competition with China had an adverse effect on production growth of industries. If at all, the third market competition had a negative effect during the pre-crisis period, although insignificant.
// Insert Table 6 here// Also, the regression results suggest that the positive effect from capital goods exports to China tends to become stronger after the crisis. In both regression (3) and (4), the estimated coefficients on XK variable are larger in absolute value and more significant after the crisis than before the crisis. Figure 2 shows the partial residual plot between production growth rate and capital goods exports to China after the crisis, based on regression model (3), which shows that some industries with extremely large share of capital goods exports or some outlier industries do not drive the result. By contrast, intermediate goods export to China was not estimated to be significant in any sub-periods. Overall, the regressions indicate that capital goods export was the main channel through which Korean manufacturing industries benefited from China's rise, and that this effect became stronger over the crisis.
//Insert Figure 2 here//
Investment Growth
In this sub-section, we discuss investment growth regression results. For the whole sample period from 1993 to 2003, the import competition from China was estimated to have negative and significant coefficients for all regressions considered here (Table 7) .
So, industries with higher import competition from China exhibited lower investment growth rate. As shown in pooled regressions for the two sub-periods (Table 8) , the strong negative effect was obtained for the pre-crisis period but it became weaker after the crisis. Thus, import competition from China might be a factor behind the slowdown in investment growth in Korean manufacturing during the 1990s before the crisis, which was shown in Table 1 . The coefficient on import competition from China after the crisis was still negative, but not significant. Other than import competition from China, none of the variables considered in this paper could explain investment growth of industries.
// Insert With this breakdown, we construct two additional explanatory variables as beforefinal capital goods export to China (XKF) and parts and accessories export to China (XKP). Although the "final" capital goods categorized here may not correspond exactly to final capital goods in economic sense, Figure 3 shows that final capital goods export to China (XKF) moves closely together with the growth of China's aggregate investment, which is a component of final demand. So, we go on to use the term final capital goods to denote machinery and capital goods excluding parts and accessories.
Primary reason for this additional breakdown is that we want to understand which type of exports to China can explain better cross-industry variations of production and investment growth. The separation of parts and accessories from other machinery and capital goods seems to be a natural way to go.
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10 Also, our empirical analysis is not a test of the hypothesis that the fragmentation of production promoted growth of Korean manufacturing industries. Irwin (2005) explains that both vertical specialization and outsourcing, which underlie fragmentation of production phenomenon, promotes greater specialization in production, leading to efficiency enhancement. Table 9 shows production growth regressions based on pooled data. The table shows that it is parts and accessories (XKP) that has a positive effect on the production growth of Korean manufacturing industries. The final capital goods (XKF) also has a positive coefficient after the crisis, but it was not significant. The coefficients on all other explanatory variables are qualitatively similar to previous regressions, except for the third market competition measure. In this case, it was estimated to be negative and significant before the crisis.
In the case of investment growth regressions, the results are somewhat mixed. That is, both final capital goods (XKF) and parts and accessories (XKP) are estimated to have some positive effects depending on the period. Final capital goods export to China has a positive effect on investment growth in the post-crisis period, while parts and accessories export to China has a positive effect in the pre-crisis period.
In sum, parts and accessories export to China had a positive effect on both production and investment growth, depending on the period, while final capital goods export to China had a positive effect only on investment growth in the post-crisis period.
So, if we focus on production growth, exports of parts and accessories (of machinery and capital goods) to China seem to have been more important to the growth of Korean manufacturing industries.
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// Insert Table 9// example.) 12 In as much as parts and accessories exports correspond to "intermediate goods" in economic sense, it is suggested that intermediate goods export, rather than final goods export, to China has been a more important channel through which China's rise benefited Korean manufacturing industries. However, as discussed above, we should be careful about this interpretation.
V. Korea's Outward FDI to China and Exports
In the previous sections, we examined the effects of the rise of China on growth of As well noted, the rise of China together, with the formation of regional production network in East Asia, provided Korea with not only low-cost production opportunity but also China's large domestic market. To utilize this opportunity, Korean firms rapidly increased FDI in China. As Table 10 shows, the China's share of Korea's total outward FDI in manufacturing sector has rapidly increasing since the 1990s, although there are some fluctuations, from about 30 percent in 1992 to about 70 percent in 2003. For most of the period Korea's outward FDI to China was concentrated in industries with low to medium capital intensities, not only in terms of its absolute value but also as share of industrial production or domestic equipment investment. However, the table also
indicates that the share of industries with high capital intensity is rapidly increasing after the crisis.
// Insert Table 10 here// Table 11 shows that the positive effect from outward FDI to China on intermediate goods exports to China is observed particularly in the pre-crisis period.
// Insert Table 11 here// However, we do not observe a positive effect of outward FDI to China on final capital goods exports (XKF) or (machinery and capital goods) parts and accessories exports (XKP). In fact, the coefficients on FDIY_CH in these regressions are estimated to be significantly negative, even controlling for the capital and skill intensities. We don't have a clear interpretation of the significantly negative coefficient. One possibility might be that these results reflect the fact that outward FDI to China was concentrated on low and medium capital intensity industries, such as apparel, leather, and furniture, which have low share of machinery and capital goods exports to China.
Overall, these results suggest that outward FDI to China promoted intermediate goods exports to China especially before the crisis. However, given our previous result that intermediate goods exports to China do not explain cross-industry variations of production or investment growth, it is suggested that outward FDI to China cannot explain cross-industry variations of growth systematically.
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VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this study, we have examined what effects the rise of China has on the growth of production and investment of Korean manufacturing industries. In doing so, we considered three main aspects of trade relation between Korea and China: import competition, third market competition and export to China. In addition, we further divided exports to China into capital goods exports and (non-machinery and non-capital equipment) intermediate goods exports. From various regression results, we could obtain both positive and negative effects from China's rise on production and investment growth of Korean manufacturing industries. On one hand, capital goods exports to China, rather than intermediate goods exports, was estimated to have positive effects on production growth of Korean manufacturing industries, especially during the period after the crisis. Results based on further division of capital goods into two subcategories reveals that especially exports of parts and accessories of machinery and capital equipment to China promoted growth of industries. Although we obtained some evidence that outward FDI to China promoted intermediate goods exports to China, particularly before the crisis, we were not able to find evidence that it promoted exports
14 Indeed, when we included FDIY_CH in regressions in Table 5 -8, it was not significant at all.
of parts and accessories (of machinery and capital equipment). On the other hand, import competition from China was estimated to have negative effects on both production and investment growth of Korean manufacturing industries, especially before the crisis. Overall, the regression results suggest that the positive effects from China's rise on the growth of Korean manufacturing industries have been strengthened after the crisis.
Although we tried to understand better the effects of the rise of China on economic growth of Korea, we think the issues raised in this paper need further scrutiny. With regard to the channel of exports to China, for example, it might be useful to distinguish Although this paper Also, we were not able to find empirical evidence suggesting that outward FDI to China promoted (machinery and capital goods) parts and accessories exports to China, which were found to have positive effects on production and investment growth of Korean manufacturing industries. One could conjecture that this result might be related to either very small outward FDI to China, relative to either production or investment, and to concentration of outward FDI to China on industries with low and medium capital intensities. However, this issue seems to be in need of further scrutiny.
< Figure 2> Partial Residual Plot between Production Growth Rate and Capital Goods
Exports to China after the Crisis (Model (3) of Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
< Table 7> Cross-section regression for real investment growth (1993~2003) Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
< Table 8> Cross-section regression for real invetment growth (Pre-crisis and Postcrisis) Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. crisis) Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
< Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
< Table 12 Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote that the estimated coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
